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Four (In)Determinabilities, Not One
Klaus Krippendorff
Rationale
Like all chapters in this volume, mine, too, concerns itself with limits of knowing. What
distinguishes this chapter from the others, however, is my accounting for these limits in terms of
(in)determinability, not (in)determinacy: (in)determinability implicates a human being‟s (in)ability to
ascertain something; (in)determinacy refers to a supposedly objective condition, which assumes
human involvement to be superfluous and dispensable. Also, I am suggesting that
(in)determinabilities are not merely of one kind--permeating different fields in different guises, as
some of the forgoing chapters are assuming (in)determinacy does--but that one needs to distinguish at
least four. I contend that (in)determinabilities arise as a consequence of different ways in which
humans choose to be involved in their worlds: spectators construct worlds that are very different from
those of, say, builders whose actions are necessary parts of the world they alter. And designing
artifacts entails a way of knowing that is quite different from that needed to use or consume artifacts
made by others. Being a member of a corporation or community entails still other ways that are not
derivable from being good at handling things. Not only do these rather different kinds of human
involvement entail different epistemologies--different ways by which one comes to know--but they
also bring forth different limits for what they enable.
I am suggesting that these epistemologies are not superior or inferior, or better or worse,
relative to each other. Their value depends on what one wants to accomplish in one‟s world. And as I
do not care to privilege one epistemology to the exclusion of all others; I can afford to move through
them with ease.
Observational Determinability
Let me define: a system is observationally determinable if an observer can predict its behavior within
reasonable computational resources and time constraints. My question is this: given an observer who
is equipped with perfect measuring and recording devices and endowed with a state-of-the art
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computer, what are the limits on observational determinability that this observer will experience? I
shall explore these limits relative to two structures of observed systems that make predictability
possible and impossible respectively.
Hans Bremermann (1962) derived a theoretical limit for computation by considering that any
computer--past, present, or future--must have some mass and occupy states marked by recognizable
energy differences. Heisenberg‟s Uncertainty Principle suggests that these energy differences, which
have to be observed or measured, cannot be arbitrarily small. This, and Einstein‟s mass-energy
equation, led Bremermann to conclude that “[n]o data processing system whether artificial or living
can process more than 2·1047 bits per second per gram of its mass” (1962:92). This number,
expressed in physical units of measurement that are rather small compared with those commonly
used by engineers, might suggest very large computational capacities ahead of us. This is not so,
however. Consider: there are only ·107 seconds to a year; the earth is about 109-1010 years old; and
its mass is less than 6·1027 grams. To put these quantities in perspective: if the whole earth were to be
converted into the most efficient computing matter, it would have been able to process not more than
1093 bits since solidification. Under equally optimal conditions, a computer of the weight of a human
brain would be able to compute no more than 1059 bits during a researcher's productive lifetime of,
say, 50 years. But no brain can be as efficient; and, moreover, a human brain has other things to do
besides observing the world.
To ascertain more realistic limits for computing observations, let me start then with
commonly available computer technology. A workstation equipped with an Intel Pentium III
microprocessor runs with a computing speed of 400 MHz. In a simple application, it executes about
167 additions per cycle1--or some 108 operations per second--about 1017 during that 50-year period,
deemed the career span of a determined researcher.2 According to Moore‟s Law, the number of
transistors on integrated circuits doubles every 18 months. Microchip development has followed the
growth rate of Moore‟s law, since its statement in 1965. But computer technology eventually must
reach a ceiling. Yet, supposing that Moore‟s Law holds for the next 20 years, the number of algebraic
operations that human observers could utilize during their active lifetime should increase from 1017 to
1021. Stating future capacities is highly speculative, of course. Nevertheless, I submit that
1

I am grateful to Jon Stromer-Galley of the Computer Center at The Annenberg School for Communication, who has
obtained these capacities for me. Using VB, the computer performed 10 7 additions per second; with C++, the
corresponding number was 107.8239.
2
A more advanced microprocessor, with a speed of 1 GHz instead of 400 MHz, would add very little to this limit,
changing the number of algebraic operations from 10 17.0198 to 1017.4177.
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computations requiring more than 1020 simple algebraic operations remain beyond reach--at least
within tomorrow‟s realistic bounds of scientific research.3
What then is the limit of observational determinability, namely, the limit of a detached
observer‟s ability to predict something not yet observed?
Trivial Machines
Let me examine a system that conforms to the scientific idea of being predictable by observation.
Such a system would behave--it would change its state over time. It would allow an observer access
to a number of observations. And the act of observation would not interfere with the operation of the
system. Note that the foregoing does not describe the properties of a system found in nature but spells
out what is meant by a detached observer who refrains from influencing how a system is behaving.
Observational determinability then means that, after a sufficiently long period of observation, the
system has exhibited enough regularity for the observer to be able to predict what it will do. Zoltan
Domotor, in this volume, is correct in stating that prediction “rests on the idea that (the) future
state(s) of a system depend...on its past or current state(s).” Since Arthur Gill (1962:8), a system that
enables prediction in precisely this sense is called a trivial machine. It has a set of inputs i, a set of
outputs o, and it conforms to a function F that relates the two sets by a many-to-one mapping:
o = F(i),
--however complex that function may be, Figure 1 below depicts such a machine:

i

F

o

A Trivial Machine
Figure 1
Trivial machines may have any number of inputs and outputs. To predict a trivial machine‟s
behavior means knowing or hypothesizing its function. To obtain this function, the researcher would
need to observe ni input/output pairs <i, o> or as many pairs as there are inputs. Even if the machine
reacts to quintillion inputs, this would still remain below 1020. In other words, trivial machines do not
present significant challenges to observational determinability. This holds equally true for trivial
3

To humble expectations, consider that the reputedly fastest supercomputer to date, Q, located at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, operates at a speed of 30,000 billion calculations per second, or mere 300 times faster than Intel
Pentium III. Under the assumption of Moore‟s Law, this supercomputer is but 12 years ahead of what is generally
available right now.
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machines that are operationally closed, in that their outputs become their inputs and define their
dynamics. In either case, once their function has been identified, they are perfectly predictable from
their inputs. In case of operationally closed trivial machines, the identification of a suitable function
is made even easier when they converge to an eigen-behavior4 as they often do. Hence:
Trivial machines are observationally determinable.
Observational determinability is an attractive condition--the very reason for the natural
sciences to bank on detached observation rather than on other forms of inquiry into their objects of
interest. It is also the reason why so many explanatory devices are aligned with trivial machine
conceptions. In regression analysis--commonly employed in the social sciences--analysts distinguish
between independent and dependent variables, the trivial machine equivalents of inputs and outputs.
And although regression equations have a distinctly probabilistic flavor, their use imposes nothing
short of trivial machine conceptions on observational data. In logic, deduction is trivial in the sense
that the minor premises are its inputs; the major premises, its functions; and the logical inference--the
conclusion--its output. Representational conceptions of language (mappings from a given language to
a meta-language) are also trivial for mapping referents into symbols. Attempting to locate brain
activity when performing a task (Gur et al., in this volume), too, is tantamount to selecting the
function of a trivial machine. Viewing communication as the accurate transmission of information
from a source to a receiver (Shannon and Weaver 1949), using a code, only trivializes
communication.
Unfortunately, reality seldom cooperates with how it is being conceptualized and observed.
When facing difficulties in prediction, instead of changing paradigms, it is customary for researchers
to hold on to the analytically convenient trivial machine conceptions and either complicating their
conception of the inputs, or weakening their criteria for prediction. In the first scenario, a researcher
may consider outputs to be predictable from multiple inputs. To so predict a machine, the researcher
needs to make not ni but up to 2ni observations, thereby reaching the limit of 1020 already by ni=66
inputs. Thus, the consideration of multiple inputs drastically limits the complexity of a system whose
behavior is predictable by an observer. Regarding weaker criteria for prediction, Domotor and
Batitsky‟s chapter distinguishes between strongly deterministic systems (Gill‟s trivial machines);
chaotic systems that, while deterministic, can be unpredictable as their behavior depends on the
4

The eigen-behavior of a dynamic system is an equilibrium, peculiar to that system, in which it follows a regular cycle
within a subset of its possible states (Dictionary of Cybernetics, http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/EQUILIBRIUM.html).
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(unknown) precision of some earlier state--causing the so-called butterfly effect; and probabilistic
systems whose outputs are random within limits, but knowable by their probabilities of occurrence. I
offered regression analysis and Claude Shannon's communication theory as two research methods
that assume probabilistic systems. In probabilistic systems, the number of observations required to
establish probability distributions is a function of the desirable level of statistical significance, calling
for sample sizes far larger than ni; again, significantly reducing the complexity of a system within the
limit of observational determinability. To these three systems come possibilistic systems, for which
observers are content when they can predict a reasonably small subset of outputs--their hope being
that actual observations are contained in the set of predicted possibilities. The rules of chess, for
example, are possibilistic. But none of these qualifications fundamentally deviate from trivial
machine conceptions. They merely reflect scientific observers' willingness to accept imperfect
predictions, while holding on to their customary detached observer role and to the analytically
convenient trivial machine conceptions of their world.5
Nontrivial Machines
In contrast to trivial machines, a nontrivial machine:


Has internal (unobservable) states z whose values codetermine its input/output relations <i, o>.



The relationship <z, z'> between present and subsequent internal states is codetermined
by the inputs i.



D is the driving function:

o = D(i, z)

and S is the state function:

z' = S(i, z)

Diagrammatically, this nontrivial machine is shown in Figure 2. Notice the loop involving its
internal states z, which can keep information circulating inside such a machine for a very long time.

5

In this volume, Domotor‟s chapter expresses this attitude quite succinctly: “Because scientific inquiry is most effective
under deterministic methodology, determinism should not be given up easily, even if this should require switching to a
more complex level of description.”
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A Nontrivial Machine
Figure 2
To predict the behavior of a nontrivial machine, accurately, amounts to finding not one but
two functions, D and S, which jointly determine the output from a record of previously observed
inputs. Heinz von Foerster (1984:12) calculated the quantitative relationships among the number ni of
two-valued inputs (0 or 1, for example), the number Nz of effective internal states, the number ND of
possible driving functions, and the number NS of effective state functions, for machines with only one
two-valued output o and ni = 1, 2, 3, and 4 two-valued inputs i, 2ni in number:
ni

Nz

ND

NS

1

4

256

65,536

2

16

21019

61076

3

256

10609

300104000

4

65,536

300104000

16001070000

Numbers within nontrivial machines, as in Figure 2,
among which informed choices would be required in order
to determine observationally which machine it is.
Table 1
In Table 1, one can see how a rather modest increase in the numbers ni of two-valued inputs
increases hyper-exponentially the number of possible functions (among which an observer would
have to select an appropriate pair), which quickly exceeds computability. With ni = 2 two-valued
inputs, the number NS = 61076 of state functions is already far above 1020--indeed, beyond
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computability on earth. But for the simplest possible case, ni = 1 two-valued inputs, all other
nontrivial machines are transcomputational. One can therefore conclude:
Nontrivial machines are observationally indeterminable
and:
The ability to predict behavior from observations is
limited to trivial machines.
These striking findings might come as a surprise to hard-nosed behaviorists, who insist on
theorizing observations only. Yet, as von Foerster (1984:13) has pointed out, the fundamental
limitation, here re-stated, "joins their famous sisters, who sing of other limitations:


Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem;



Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle;



Gill's (1962) Indeterminacy Principle."

This limit on observational determinability spells out the limit of empirical research as we
know it.
Synthetic Determinability
Notwithstanding this fundamental limit for understanding a system by detached observation,
we seem to have no difficulties conceptualizing and building nontrivial machines, computers, for
example, which have an extensive memory in the form of internal loops, and proceed recursively-just as the minimal nontrivial machine in Figure 2 does, only in a more complex manner. This
discrepancy signals a very different kind of human involvement: the design, engineering, building,
and manufacture of tangible artifacts.
Let me define: a system is synthetically determinable if it can be realized as intended,
according to specifications (instructions, programs, or plans) within reasonable resources and time
limits. I shall call such systems technological artifacts to distinguish them from other human
creations that cannot be built to specifications, as shall be seen below.
All technological artifacts are designed to serve intended functions in the context of other
technological artifacts, often comprising larger technological systems. And obviously, the mere
existence of human artifacts is sufficient proof of their synthetic determinability.
Before going further, let me briefly review the argument that led to the conclusion that trivial
machines are observationally determinable whereas nontrivial machines are not. It involved, first,
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designing two artifacts--one demonstrably below the limit of observational determinability, and the
other above it; and then, varying their structure to ascertain the limits of their observational
determinability. But note that the knowledge of these systems‟ functions and the ability to vary them
is not available to detached observers of such systems, only to their designers and builders. Designers
typically translate their ideas into realizable specifications and, in the above, into pencil-on-paper
machines. One most likely could build a machine that was worked out on paper, and then let people
make the effort of predicting its future states from past observations. In the course of such
explorations, one may well face observational indeterminability. However, without knowing the
design of the machine, one would certainly not be able to link the experience of observational
indeterminability to the nontrivial structure of the machine: one could not explain it, hence, the
importance of having different epistemologies at one‟s disposal.
Clearly, the realization of technological artifacts by design, tantamount to intervening in
nature and ultimately creating a human-made world, entails an epistemology that is wholly different
from the epistemology of observing a world of preexisting objects of nature, or artifacts--as if their
genesis were unknown. The shift from knowing by observation to knowing by design is a shift from
spectator knowledge (of knowing no more than what one can see), to constructive knowledge (of
knowing how to realize something), a shift from seeking certainty by induction (generalization or
categorization) to seeking certainty by solving a technological problem; and a shift from trivializing
the world, to creating desirable complexities in that world. These two epistemologies are
incommensurate; none is reducible to the other. For detached observers, the problem is one of
hypothesizing a design so that it accounts for what happens to be observable. For builders, however,
the problem is one of realizing the specifications of a given design. There is an asymmetry for the
two epistemologies: once the system has been built and it works as intended, there is no reason to
hypothesize and test what its designers already know. When synthetic determinability is satisfied,
observational indeterminability is no longer an issue.6
But what are the limits of synthetic determinability? I shall mention three frequently cited
limits but will rely on a fourth:

6

This statement assumes communication between the observers of a system and its designers. Once observers have
obtained the design of the system, their efforts to figure it out become superfluous. However, there are situations in which
such communication is to be prevented. For example, the purpose of designing secure encryption codes is to make them
observationally indeterminable. When such codes correspond to trivial machines, they may be broken with adequate
computational resources and time. Unbreakable codes, by definition, can only be acquired, not broken.
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Physical laws are most frequently mentioned. The perpetuum mobile, an old idea that has
occupied the imagination of many, contradicts thermodynamic laws and is hence believed
to be impossible to build. Traveling back in time is the stuff of science fiction. But since
reversibility contradicts the definitions of time in several well-established theories, of
evolution, for example, designing a time machine is considered an exercise in futility. The
limits of computability, Bremermann‟s limit for example, states in physical terms why
computation cannot exceed 2·1047 bit/sec/gr. Physical limits are seemingly definite, as is
observational indeterminability. But the domain of actual technological problems, say, of
building fuel-efficient cars, or faster and more powerful computers--are still far removed
from these limits, leaving ample space for human ingenuity to take effect. One may
experience the feeling of approaching such limits when facing increasing difficulties in
designing more powerful computer chips, permanent storage media, extremely small
(nanotechnological) mechanisms, very tall skyscrapers, perfectly reliable measuring
instruments, cold fusion, travel near the speed of light, or in attempting to build a human
habitat on Mars, for instance.



Techno-logical constraints in turn are limits on one‟s ability to manufacture parts,
assemble artifacts from components, and to make them work. The hyphen between techno
and logical is meant to highlight that there is a logic to synthesis. Techno-logical
constraints concern known solutions to technical problems and available means of
production. These limits are not, however, as definite as physical laws are believed to be.
Some such constraints diminish as technology advances, largely because technology
applies to itself and bootstraps its complexities to greater heights. Yet, at any one moment,
insurmountable techno-logical barriers seem to cause failures should attempts be made to
cross them. The reason for not hearing of too many transgressions of techno-logical limits
is that synthetic indeterminabilities tend to be caught in the arguments among engineers,
well before they manifest themselves as failures. Questions of whether something can
indeed be realized, and where the boundary of synthetic determinability hides, dominate
the discourse of engineers and permeate the conversations among designers.



Economic constraints are obvious. In competition, artifacts that can be manufactured
cheaper, distributed with less effort, and perform more efficiently are more likely to
succeed than those that do not measure up to these criteria. In his “Architecture of
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Complexity”, Herbert Simon illustrated how technological structures imply economic
advantages by means of the parable of two watchmakers (1981:188-195). One
watchmaker worked components into various subassemblies and ultimately into a
functioning watch. The other assembled all components in a single uninterruptible
process. When the former answered incoming calls from clients placing orders, all he lost
was the subassembly he was working on, whereas the latter had to start all over again.
Needless to say, the former could produce more than the latter and stay in business. We
know of many technological ideas, the realization of which may easily exceed available
community resources--whether they be building a geodesic dome over Chicago, beaming
sun energy to a power plant on earth, or eradicating a communicable disease from the
human population. Technological artifacts become cheaper over time. In the 1960s, the
very idea of putting humans on the moon bordered on economic irresponsibility. Now,
space tourism is in the news.
These limits of synthetic determinability appear fluid, at least from a historical perspective.
But there is a more definite cut-off point for synthetic determinability: autopoiesis.
As noted, the very existence of technological artifacts is proof of their synthetic
determinability. But the earth is populated by many synthetically indeterminable systems. Living
beings for one, and social institutions for another, simply cannot be manufactured as mechanical
devices are. Notwithstanding science fiction, and contrary to the Golem legend, there are no
specifications, and no assembly lines--indeed, no ways of putting living beings together from parts,
and then blowing life into them. Even major replacements of human organs and limbs are undertaken
while the subject is alive.
A crucial structural feature of living beings is their autopoiesis. Autopoietic systems produce
themselves by manufacturing all the components necessary to operate the very network of production
that produces them (Maturana and Varela, 1972). Autopoietic systems also find themselves in
continual interaction with their environment without, however, being causally determined by it: their
environment may perturb the dynamics of autopoietic systems but cannot determine it, however. This
is evident in the very absence of correlations between the organization of living systems and the
features of their environments. Hence, autopoietic systems are considered organizationally closed-operationally closed regarding the autopoiesis of their organization. They cannot be instructed from
their outside, and they cannot be designed or built according to specifications. Indeed, the genesis of
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autopoietic systems does not resemble that of machines, whether trivial or nontrivial. Here then, one
faces a structural or organizational limit of what can be produced by design:
Autopoietic systems are synthetically indeterminable.
Hermeneutic Determinability
I consider hermeneutic determinability as the human ability to understand and to use artifacts
in the context of a community or culture. I am speaking here of cultural artifacts that exist, not
merely on account of having been realized materially, but because of the uses they have acquired for
the members of a community. The use of artifacts by individual community members (each an
organizationally closed human being) is not explainable in terms of specifications and cannot be so
manufactured either. The use of artifacts is, hence, synthetically indeterminable. I shall exemplify
hermeneutic determinability via three dissimilar cultural artifacts: texts, public spaces, and personal
computers.
Texts are written for being read, usually by others, although their writers always are the first
readers and critics of a text. Texts can be reproduced mechanically but are meaningless without
someone making sense of them. Quite unlike what the popular container metaphor suggests, texts do
not literally contain meanings that could be conveyed from authors to readers. The use of this
container metaphor diverts attention from what readers do with a text to the properties of that text-much like the use of the optical metaphor for observation diverts attention from processes of
observation to the properties of observed objects--or from determinability to determinacy for that
matter. Also, reading is far from a mechanical process and quite unlike what a computer does when
importing data--often described as „reading files.‟ Attentive reading involves human imagination,
directs readers‟ attention, and can inform actions. For example, reading one part of a newspaper may
direct readers to other parts, which in turn might lead them to revise the former reading and redirect
their attention to still other sections of that paper (see Clark‟s chapter).
The process of reading is aptly described by the well-known hermeneutic circle, which is a
recursive process of exploring what something could possibly mean against the background of one‟s
previous readings and experiences within a community. It converges to a state of understanding. 7
7

On the difference between understanding and comprehension: Understanding is the state in which all pertinent questions
on a subject under consideration seem to be answered, and one can go on to other subjects. Comprehension means
possessing full and correct knowledge of something. Thus, comprehension invokes the criterion of correctness, as in
passing a test, whereas understanding does not.
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When hermeneutic explorations occur in conversation, any one participant's understanding takes
account of the implications of the other participants‟ understanding.
Any one reader‟s understanding--namely, the hermeneutic process involved in making sense
of a text--is not accessible to observation by someone else, least of all by someone unfamiliar with
that reader‟s background. This makes the reading of text observationally indeterminable. The only
way to understand a text is to read it as a member of the reader‟s community. Nor is it possible to
specify how a text is to be read: authors do not have the power to enforce a particular reading of their
writing--despite common expectations and personal disappointments when such expectations are
frustrated. Thus, text is synthetically indeterminable.
This is not to deny that readers could coordinate their understanding;8 for example, regarding
a text, by conversing on it with other readers, answering questions concerning each other's
understanding, negotiating a consensus on what it is to mean, or joining in a relevant action. Hence,
no matter the materiality of text and despite the fundamental autonomy of understanding,
communication can transform a text into a cultural artifact, allowing it to participate in joint
community practices. Except for their use as secret messages, texts are created to be hermeneutically
determinable; that is, to support certain practices of a community or culture.
Thus, texts are unintelligible without some minimal knowledge of the history of coordination
of reading inside the community or culture that produced them. This inescapably ties the
understanding of text to its reader's familiarity with, or membership in, a community. Texts are
prototypical cultural artifacts. To gain an understanding of the appropriate uses of texts, one cannot
afford to play the role of a detached observer, or that of a designer--such as an author who expects
that her text would be read as intended. Hermeneutic determinability can be achieved only by
participating in the ongoing history of using the very cultural artifacts that one is inquiring about (see
Breckman‟s chapter).
Public spaces are architectural creations for access by people: plazas, parks, streets, sidewalk
cafés, shopping malls, restaurants, and official buildings. I shall take a bank building as my second
example of a cultural artifact. Any building must be „read‟ as its use unfolds, much like a text needs
to be understood at each point, in order to lead the reader to its end.
8

Note: the coordination of understanding--aligning the mutually observed (con-sensual) consequences of understanding-is unlike what is commonly expressed as a sharing of understanding, information, experiences, or perspectives. The latter
expression relies on a metaphor that misleads one to believe one could compare two individuals‟ understandings while
one can ascertain only whether the observed consequences of others‟ understanding are consistent with the hypothesis
that their understanding does not differ from one‟s own. Literacy is the coordination of reading practices within a culture.
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As an institution, a bank could be housed in any building, of course; but in the United States,
the exteriors of bank buildings are recognizably different from the façades of other public edifices
such as schools, railroad stations, city halls, museums, libraries, post offices, theaters, or universities.
Traditionally, it was Hellenistic columns and other ornamentations that served as signs to expect a
bank inside, now slowly changing towards glass and chrome structures, expressing wealth and
security.
Making sense of and subsequently using a bank building is partly culturally scripted. Outside
of office hours, the building is locked and „breaking and entering‟ becomes a criminal act. When the
bank is open for business, users must enter through designated doors, which they know how to
handle, only to find themselves in an interior with multiple clues as to what one can and must not do
while inside. The interiors of banks are designed to discourage indeterminability; and mistakes in
their use are quickly corrected. The customary subdivision of bank interiors into distinct sections,
separating customers from bank employees, is intended to prevent confusion as to who is who, and
what each is entitled to do in that space. In this environment, there is room for hermeneutic
explorations, of course: customers may ask for assistance and receive instructions for obtaining what
they want. The first bank robbery exploited an existing hermeneutic indeterminability, just as any
new trick does that a robber may invent. Any repetition, at least at the same bank, is less likely to
succeed as the bank devises preventive measures. Nowadays, the very concept of a bank robbery
entails the expectation of a sequence of more or less foreseeable events in which bank employees and
customers know what to do. This makes the outcome of an attempted bank robbery more
hermeneutically determinable.
Merely observing what goes on in a bank would simply bewilder the detached observer
visiting from a culture devoid of banks. And how that bank was built would be totally irrelevant for
its users. Thus, experiencing hermeneutic (in)determinability is unrelated to observational and
synthetic (in)determinabilities, but presupposes full use of banking practices.
Personal computers, although obviously different from printed matter and public spaces,
nonetheless are experienced in a similar circular involvement. Computer users continually monitor
the effects of their pointing, clicking, and keying, while navigating through a network of options
toward desired destinations. Knowing how to use a computer is not enhanced by knowing what the
computer „really‟ does, how its internal architecture was conceived, where its files are kept, or why it
was manufactured, let alone by whom. „How-to-use‟ knowledge manifests itself in the confidence
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that one‟s sensory-motor coordination is afforded by a machine, and the perception of a path to where
one wants to be.
In the 1960s, operating a computer was a technical expertise; contemporary computer use is
part of a rapidly growing form of literacy, not unlike that of reading text or using public spaces.
Today, computers have become important cultural artifacts by supporting innumerable social and
cultural practices.
Hermeneutic determinability is the decisive criterion for all cultural artifacts. Just as text is
written to hold the attention of its readers, public buildings are designed to allow one's business to be
conducted, so are computer interfaces meant to enable users to follow their own paths without
disruption in understanding.
Hermeneutic indeterminability is experienced precisely where understanding breaks down.
This happens when the natural sensory-motor coordination with cultural artifacts is disrupted; when
users find themselves stuck at a place without an apparent escape; or when they unintentionally hurt
themselves or others. Even reading may become disrupted upon encountering words with unknown
meanings, foreign expressions without an accompanying translation, or complex grammatical
constructions. In the latter cases, indeterminability may be only temporary and could be relatively
easily overcome by asking experts, consulting users‟ manuals, dictionaries in the case of texts, or
simply figuring things out on one‟s own.
An artifact with enduring hermeneutical indeterminabilities would be a string of characters
from an unfamiliar alphabet that one cannot relate to, much less decipher: Mayan hieroglyphic
writing, for example, was initially taken to be art and appreciated as such. But hypothesizing them to
be texts entailed the assumption that they must have meant something other than being merely
decorative to the members of the culture that produced them. Yet, to determine their original
meanings, and how they were used, requires considerable familiarity with Mayan culture.
Archeologists unearth many hermeneutically indeterminable objects: if they do not seem to be
a product of nature, they are considered artifacts and having had a use. However, if no one can
determine why they were made, or how they served their culture of origin, one may be able to tell the
story of how these objects came into the archeologists‟ possession, but their original meanings and
uses remain hermeneutically indeterminable--future interpretations notwithstanding.
For handling cultural artifacts, observational determinability is not an issue: computers are
nontrivial machines par excellence, and very much in use as such. Synthetic determinability, a
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prerequisite for technological artifacts to become cultural artifacts, is of concern only to the producers
of writing and printing matter in the case of texts; to architects and building contractors, in the case of
buildings; and to computer engineers and manufacturers, in the case of personal computers. In turn,
to become hermeneutically determinable to the members of a community, the designers of cultural
artifacts must be members of that community as well and familiar with its culture (Krippendorff,
2005). The key to hermeneutic determinability lies in the practices of a community or culture that
through narratives, metaphors, and examples, assign particular meanings and uses to its artifacts,
which cannot be understood from outside that culture. Therefore:
Within one's own culture,
cultural artifacts are hermeneutically determinable,
whereas:
Artifacts of alien cultures
are likely to be hermeneutically indeterminable.9
As further examples of hermeneutic indeterminability, I acknowledge Warren Breckman's
chapter on the indeterminacy of historical facts, Jay Reise's on music appreciation, and Steven
Gross's on vagueness, indeterminacy, and uncertainty, in this volume.
Constitutive Determinability
Recall that cultural artifacts are materially and functionally different from those who put them
to use. It is by exercising their hermeneutic abilities that the members of a community or culture
appropriate them in support of their practices of living. What must be noted now is that cultural
artifacts--be they texts, public spaces, or computers--do not have hermeneutic abilities. They cannot
understand and do not act the way human beings do. They exhibit physical limits, perhaps, and it is
within these limits that they afford innumerably many interpretations and acquire countless uses, but
they cannot understand what they do, and how or that they are being used. This raises the question:
what happens when human beings apply their hermeneutic abilities not just to cultural artifacts but
also to each other?

9

Recalling the difference between understanding and comprehension, one safely can generalize that viable communities
provide hermeneutic determinability for virtually all objects of nature and artifacts, even when they originated from an
alien culture. Hermeneutic indeterminability always is related to the conviction, if not fear, that there must be more to
one‟s current understanding. The search for the „original‟ meaning of an alien text is based on the conviction that there
should have been one. Absent access to the original use of a text from an alien culture, there is no criterion to determine
whether one‟s understanding is correct.
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Students of anthropology learn of the extraordinary difficulties if not impossibility of
understanding other people in their own terms, and of comprehending concepts that are very different
from one's own. Trained ethnographers are not exempt from encountering such difficulties. In fact,
nobody can escape one‟s own categories, one‟s own world, and simply enter the worlds of others.
What ethnographers end up providing are accounts of their own observations and interactions with
their informants, using as many perspectives as they can. And if this account is both fair and
symmetrical, then it must go beyond the ethnographer‟s understanding of the people studied. It must
include these peoples' understanding of the role that the ethnographer is playing in their lives, what
his or her questions mean to them. The social relationships that arise when people apply their
hermeneutic abilities to „being-with‟ each other, when they develop an understanding of each other‟s
understanding, are „artifacts‟ in their own right. But such relationships do not exist independent of
human participation. They reside between its participants while being supported by all those
involved. Indeed, relationships of this nature are the fundamental building blocks of social systems,
large or small.
Let me define a social system:


It encompasses human participants as its members;



It resides in the interactions between its members, who, at various times, (re-)constitute10
both the system and their own membership in it. As such, social systems are intermittently
active and self-organizing or organizationally closed;



Its members perform certain acts and utterances that constitute the system‟s identity;



Its members act in the understanding that all other members act within their own
understanding of the system and hold each other accountable for apparent deviations from
their perception of the system‟s identity;



Its viability is demonstrated by its repeatable reconstitution, transcending its individual
membership.11

10

Note: Defining means declaring two linguistic expressions to be equivalent in meaning and, hence, substitutable for
each other. A definition does not involve the definer who essentially stays out of the equivalence it declares. By contrast,
constituting means establishing the identity of a phenomenon (and distinguishing it from other kinds) by the participants
in that very phenomenon: by its constituents. The U.S. Constitution, for example, was adopted by the acts of its
signatories, who applied to themselves what it stipulated--without reference to or relying on an outside authority. The
definition of social systems proposed here, leaves the establishment of the system‟s identity to its members.
11
This definition accepts the autopoietic nature of the human participants in social systems and relies on the notion of
organizational closure, which is common to autopoietic and social systems. Evidently, I am following not Niklas
Luhmann (1995) here, but Umberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1972), who prefer to limit their concept of
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I offer three examples of social systems that might clarify what is meant by constitutive
(in)determinability: family, economy, and languaging.
A family must have at least two members, who see each other as members of their family. The
notion of a family, the evolving practices it embraces, have a long history, due to the fact that various
people at different times constitute themselves as a family and demonstrate this form of „being-with‟
each other to siblings, friends, and attentive neighbors.
As a social system, a family is constructed not without foundation. It stands on the social
institution of marriage, for example, which in turn rests on the idea of making and abiding by
contracts. A family is not isolated either. Obligations that arise from being a family member may be
enforced by law; for example, regarding the raising of children, or may have political implications,
for example, concerning the paying of taxes. As is true for all social systems, a family is also only
intermittently active. Family members are not prevented from assuming other roles--whether as
students, athletes, art collectors, employees, drivers of automobiles, or tourists. While family
members participate in other social systems, their family is temporarily suspended, virtual, not
performed, and to be reconstituted when needed. As family members bring their own hermeneutic
abilities into the process, a family dynamically defines itself; thus, no two families are alike. Even
biological descendency is not a sufficient criterion for defining a family. Lineage is something that
family members may invoke and recognize as being constitutive of the identity of their family, but
this is not a necessity. The adoption of children, or the deliberate severance of family ties,
demonstrates the absence of biological determinism.
A family thus exists by virtue of its members‟ performing certain constitutive acts, which may
include staying in touch, using appropriate modes of address, caring for children, deferring to elders,
participating in family rituals, celebrating anniversaries, honoring special family events, keeping
family secrets inside the family, freely sharing resources, supporting disabled members, and invoking
the „we‟ of family solidarity. These family-constituting acts convey a sense of belonging while also
successfully distinguishing the family from other social systems.

autopoiesis to biological systems. While social systems are intermittently reconstitutable by its members, the components
of autopoietic systems tend to be continually engaged. Equally important is the difference between the social systems
concept adopted here and the one typically advocated by general systems theorists (GSTs), following Ludwig von
Bertalanffy (1968). In my definition, a social system‟s identity arises in the interactions among its human constituents. In
GST, the a system‟s identity is contrasted with its environment and this distinction is made by a theorist, who is not part
of the system, claims privileged access to the nature of the system and of the environment it is facing. This effectively
overrides the system concepts enacted by its constituents.
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The constitutive determinability of a family is constantly tested by deviant family members,
by family tragedies, or simply by the process of growing up, and out. Constitutive indeterminability
comes to be experienced by members not succeeding in reconstituting their family at appropriate
occasions, and with previous members; for example, when members refuse to speak with one
another, family rituals are no longer performed or attended to, and nothing seems to work as it once
did; for example, after a hostile divorce or the death of a key family member. What appears to be the
disintegration of a family is the inability of its (former) members to reconstitute its practices. This
inability is rarely attributable to any one participant but to the failure of reciprocally performing the
constitutive acts and utterances that would keep a family viable.
Another social system is the economy, with money as its key (cultural) artifact. Money has no
intrinsic value except that which participants in an economy attribute to it. Notwithstanding that a
100 dollar bill may mean little to a millionaire, yet the world to a pauper, money facilitates
commerce: the exchange of goods and services; the accumulation of capital; the acquisition of and
submission to social or political controls; not least, the mass communication of a collective lifestyle
that supports the economy.
All of these activities require the participation of more or less informed, rational, and
motivated actors--not as individuals, but as constituents of the economy--each, acting in the
expectation that the other constituents value money as well. Absent such reciprocated expectations,
no economy could materialize.
Each monetary transaction implicitly tests, reconfirms or modifies the meaning that money
holds for its users. It is the intertwined expectations that the members of an economy must have of
each other, which render money an economy-constituting artifact. Legal institutions do their part in
preserving the constitutional determinability of an economy by discouraging improper uses of money,
such as theft, money laundering, bribery, or forgery. And financial institutions--the U.S. Federal
Reserve Bank, for example--endeavor to sustain the value of a currency. When the institutions that
are determined to prevent deviations from the desirable use of money become weak (or are perceived
to be ineffective), and the constituents‟ intertwined expectations can no longer be relied upon, money
would loose its worth, and the economy could collapse. This labile condition is tantamount to a
constitutive indeterminability, here in the form of an economic crisis during which economic actors
would no longer know how much they have, whom to trust, and what to do with each other.
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We know of the social and political havoc that can follow when a currency looses its value.
Whereas inflation may not be entirely indeterminable when its rate is known, it can cause trust in the
use of money to erode, creating underground economies, scapegoats, and upheavals, apt to topple
governments. Revitalizing a failing economy is one of the most daunting political tasks, largely
because an economy is constituted in the very activities through which its decline is experienced.
This makes it difficult to intervene from the „outside‟ of an economy as a social system.
Now on to the example of languaging: languaging, the process of using language, is not
manifest in ways cultural artifacts are. It is a cooperative practice that cannot be touched or
photographed. Languaging is constituted in how multitudes of speakers coordinate their living,
engage each other in conversations, and construct the realities they come to consider their habitat.
Languaging is observationally indeterminable: speakers are nontrivial and what they do is rarely less
than that. There is no way of predicting where a conversation may go, or which realities may come to
be constructed in the process--except by direct participation. Languaging is also synthetically
indeterminable. True, stretches of speech may be scripted, as in theatrical performances; in routines,
such as in common greetings or when ordering a meal in a restaurant; or in ritual practices--but only
for short time spans. The rules of grammar cannot predict what people will end up saying, either.
Languaging provides room for creativity. It never quite repeats itself. Writing produces texts. But as
cultural artifacts, texts are monologous. By representing only their writers‟ voice, texts are truncated
records of what speakers do most naturally: speaking with each other, engaging one another in
inherently unpredictable dialogues; coordinating their activities towards specific ends; or developing
and testing the existence of consensus. Languaging is interactive, and in a speech community, no
single member is in charge.
Languaging is also hermeneutically indeterminable: when speakers, each endowed with
hermeneutic abilities, inquire into what the other speakers meant to say, that very inquiry places the
original meanings in the shadow of an emerging coordination. While thus embracing each other‟s
understanding, that coordination cannot be anticipated by either participant. The sounds, facial
expressions, and writing that people generate while languaging may be considered technological
artifacts, especially when recorded, reproduced, and materially disseminated. Languaging, however,
is not reducible to such products. It fundamentally involves the interweaving of cultural products into
a fabric that always implicates the bodily participation of its speakers.
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By contrast to the verb „languaging,‟ the noun „language‟ designates a decontextualized
abstraction from what happens inside a speech community, its vocabulary and syntax. As such an
abstraction, the concept of language resides elsewhere--in the language of linguists for example, who
typically put themselves in the role of detached observers, attempting to describe systemic
invariances across speakers and situations. For Noam Chomsky (1957:85), the task of linguistics is to
construct “a device ... (called a grammar) for generating all and only the sentences of a language.” In
seeking to design such an explanatory mechanism, linguists limit themselves to the study of the
synthetically determinable features of languaging. Although this aim recognizes the nontrivial nature
of the machinery that produces language,12 it leaves no place for context-sensitive interpretations, for
poetic innovations, and for conversation or dialogue. Since Ferdinand de Saussure (1960), linguistics
has managed to protect itself from the challenges of indeterminabilities by theorizing writing or
transcribed speech, not languaging, and by narrowing its scope to the structure of sentences--not
utterances. By ignoring how language is constituted by its speakers, theorizing sentences becomes a
literally meaningless exercise. And studying language as an instrument of persuasion by and of
individual speakers, as rhetoricians do; or viewing it as logic, as some philosophers of science insist
upon, reduces the essentially interactive or dialogical nature of languaging to a rational monologue.
Social systems, being essentially self-organizing, grant their members the ability to constitute
them voluntarily. Thus, it is the users of language who decide who is or is not competent in using it,
which usages are or are not correct, and where new metaphors are or are not appropriate. It follows
that the constitutive determinability of languaging rests on its speakers who, in languaging with each
other, ensure the continued viability of the process of languaging. Language is performed much as a
family is enacted and not unlike how an economy manifests itself in the very transactions that bring it
into being for what it is or is becoming.
How social systems are constituted and how they preserve their identity are major topics of
inquiries in the social sciences. In this volume, references are made to economic and political
development with regard to urban and regional planning (chapter by Tomazinis), which are
phenomena that cannot exist without the active participation of human actors.
Studies of the constitutive nature of social systems often reveal the epistemological
difficulties (indeterminabilities) that social scientists encounter when approaching their subjects with
12

Note that Chomsky‟s work on generative grammars sought to move linguistics away from behaviorism, which limits
itself to observation-based theories. It ushered in linguistics‟ current alliance with cognitivism in psychology and artificial
intelligence.
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trivial machine conceptions in mind--to protect the psychologically comfortable and analytically
undemanding role of detached and superior observers--limiting themselves to hermeneutic
explorations, for example; or trying to design an organization from the position of an authority. Only
active participation in the constitutive practices of social systems--without fear of becoming part of
and thereby changing the nature of the very social system one is facing--makes it possible to test a
social system‟s constitutive determinability. Consequently, and quite analogous to the evidence for
synthetic and hermeneutic determinabilities, viability is sufficient proof that:
Social systems are constitutively determinable
in the sense that their identity--namely their boundary and ability to reconstitute themselves--is
preserved by the actions of their members.
Myriad social systems are known to have become constitutively indeterminable. Some, like
empires or monopolies, became too big to be self-governable; some others, plagued by members‟
incompatible conceptions concerning what it is that they participate in--have ended in break-ups,
divorces, or civil wars. Still other social systems have disappeared for lack of resources, as when
social movements loose their members; for reasons of inefficiency, as when businesses loose their
competitive edge; for lack of requisite solidarity, as when essential cooperation turns into distrust;
and for inappropriate interactions, as when members fight to gain individual power at the expense of
what is constitutively required. What these examples have in common is that the constitutionally
required acts that gave the system its dynamic coherence and viability are no longer performed.
In conclusion
So far, I have avoided referring to philosophical doctrines. This served my effort to state limits of
different kinds of knowing with a minimum of academic prejudice. Now, however, I would like to
place the distinctions that emerged from my explorations in the context of some other literatures.
The belief that knowledge, in order to be valid, must be predictive and stated from the
position of neutral and objective observers is central to positivism, of course. It essentially seeks to
bypass human observers for their supposed unreliability. This futile effort is correlated with belief
that the world is one coherent causally determined system that affords but one and only one accurate
description: a uni-verse, a single-version of that world. It denies the positionality of knowledge and
excludes the observer from the determination of that uni-verse. This epistemology has fueled the
natural sciences and underlies the very idea of indeterminacy--as if the inability to figure out what
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something is were a property of the unobserved uni-verse. Perhaps those who adopt this stance
should avoid the word „predictability‟ altogether, as it implies a human ability. While stating my
position so strongly, I wish to reaffirm: there is nothing wrong with being a spectator at least
occasionally. Who would not enjoy watching, wondering, or being entertained? Surveying the sky
has fascinated people for eons. But privileging this epistemology at the exclusion of all others does
not do justice to what it means to be human. I am therefore suggesting that we:
(1)

Recognize as an illusion the belief in being able to observe without acknowledging
being the observer, without acknowledging our bodily, emotional, conceptual, and
social participation in what we see;

(2)

Discontinue the practice of objectifying one‟s experiences, in this instance, of projecting
determinability or indeterminability onto the systems of one‟s interest and casting them
as properties of such systems, that is, in terms of determinacy or indeterminacy;

(3)

Cease trivializing the world by, on the one hand insisting on predictability as the sole
criterion for scientific knowledge, and, on the other hand adopting trivial machines as
the models of choice for scientific explanations, thereby unwittingly delegitimizing
other ways of knowing.

Objects and happenings
are found
in nature
Technological artifacts
are designed
to serve functions
Cultural artifacts
are used
within a community
Social systems
are constituted
by their members‟ actions

Observational
determinability

Synthetic
determinability

Hermeneutic
determinability

Constitutive
determinability

Predictability
from past
observations

may enter
a design as resources

may acquire
meanings and uses

may participate
in social systems

irrelevant to design

Realizability
from available
resources

may acquire
meanings and uses

may participate
in social systems

irrelevant to use

irrelevant to use

Usability
(and understandability)
within a community

may participate
in social systems

irrelevant to being

irrelevant to being

Irrelevant to being

Viability
of a social system’s
identity as constituted

Four Determinabilities and their Criteria,
Based on Human Involvement
Table 2
Table 2 gives an overview of how human involvement with artifacts, including objects and
happenings of nature, relate to the four determinabilities, which I have distinguished in this chapter.
Its diagonal lists human abilities, which serve as criteria for determinability and define the artifacts in
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question. The six cells of its upper right triangle spell out the roles that these artifacts may play in
what each determinability specifically addresses. And the six cells of its lower left triangle speak to
the relevance of a determinability to the artifacts of each kind. I would like to discuss these
relationships further.
The design of technological artifacts--whether in composing music (Reise, in this Volume),
planning urban development (Tomazinis), or constructing mathematical models (Domotor and
Batitsky)--is not derivable from observations of nature. Rather, designing entails the distinctly human
ability to envision desirable futures, create paths toward their realization, and inspire others to join
the effort of changing the world in ways that could not come about naturally. Consequently, the
genesis of technological artifacts is inherently non-deterministic, and thus unpredictable by
observation. Designers are involved, not detached; and what they specify changes the world as
experienced without following natural laws. Calling disciplines that intervene in the world „applied‟
insinuates their inferiority to pure theoretical knowledge (Simon 1981) and to their practitioners‟
inability to assume a God‟s eye view (Putnam, 1981)--so uncritically enjoyed by scientific observers.
Today, most technological artifacts are nontrivial and, hence, escape observational determinability.
There are a few approaches towards an epistemology of design (for one attempt, see
Krippendorff, 2005). Radical constructivism (Glasersfeld, 1995) comes close, but goes beyond the
specific definition of technological artifacts that I have adopted in this chapter. The 18th century
Italian philosopher and political scientist, Giambattista Vico (1962), was probably the first to
distinguish the epistemology of construction from Cartesian representationalism. Vico also wrote on
social institutions as human accomplishments, recognizing constitutive features of what I described
here as social systems. Simon (1981) was the most recent philosopher of the sciences of the artificial.
He focused largely on engineering, computer design, and management and, unfortunately, dealt with
these as technological problems. Although Simon was not concerned with the synthetic
indeterminabilities in these sciences, he recognized the difference between the kind of knowledge that
underlies processes of designing, and the kind of knowledge that the natural sciences create about the
world as is: deontic knowledge and propositional knowledge, respectively. Designers know the
structure of their design and how it should work. And once a technological artifact is realized and
works as intended, trying to predict its behavior by observation becomes a redundant academic
exercise. At best, it could serve as a test for the correct implementation of what designers had
specified, without, however, gaining additional understanding.
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Knowing how to use artifacts, what can be done with them, differs from knowing their
composition and genesis. Pragmatism has made useful knowledge the centerpiece of its attention.
And symbolic interactionism has carried this philosophy into sociology. I situate myself closer to
cultural anthropology here. It has taught me to respect the great diversity of uses, understandings,
and meanings that cultural artifacts can acquire in different communities. Usability and
understandability co-evolve in the actual use of such artifacts, but they also provide support for the
continuing evolution of technology within a community or culture. As hermeneutics has taught,
understanding is a project that is never finished. Its limits are experienced at the boundaries of one's
communities. As Table 2 suggests, if usability is at issue, observational determinability is of little
relevance, and synthetic determinability can be taken for granted. Usability, it should be noted, has
nothing to do with the unattended nature of artifacts, but everything with what it enables humans to
do with them.
Being--performing the very social system whose identity is the product of what its
constituents do, and shapes the identity of its members in return--involves a recursively interlaced coknowing, that cannot be acquired from outside that system. This is not to say that social systems
could not be recognized by non-members and used for all kinds of purposes by them. Members of a
family can talk about the economy, for example, much as social scientists can do research on
families, yet in so doing, they remain outsiders of the system of their interests. What keeps any social
system viable is the performance of constitutionally required reciprocal practices, preserving its
identity over time. However, the effects of these practices can be experienced only by being part of
the system. Similarly, a language can be used in its capacity to describe, instruct, or influence, as a
cultural artifact. This, however, is beside the point of what languaging does13 as a social system:
coordinating speakers‟ practices of living, bringing particular realities to speakers‟ attention, but
especially directing the evolution of languaging within the community of speakers. I consider all
reconstitutable patterns of „being-with‟ each other as social systems: determinable when they prove
themselves viable and indeterminable when they do not. Social systems are human artifacts. They are
distinguished, however, from artifacts that are merely observed, manufactured, or used, by their
inclusion of constituent members whose perceptions, actions, and utterances determine the system‟s
organization and identity and their own role within it.

13

See Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) and other philosophers of language.
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In the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that I did not want to privilege one kind of
knowing at the expense of others. I hope that this chapter has demonstrated the epistemological
benefits of navigating across different kinds of human involvement. My explanation of the limit of
observational indeterminability, for instance, relied on knowing the internal makeup of two systems,
a knowledge that would be available only to their designers, builders, or those willing to take
especially nontrivial artifacts apart, reassemble them, and put them back to work. Allowing oneself to
so enter one‟s domain of interest provides more information than merely observing that domain from
its outside. And without the liberty to examine one kind of knowing by means of another,
indeterminabilities could not be explained or accounted for. The chapters on chaos and complexity,
and on structure, by Domotor and Batitsky, have less to do with nature than with theories about
nature. Before the invention of chaos theory, few people cared about the phenomena that the theory
purports to describe. This fact provides still another example of how language is implicated in the
social construction of reality, even in the ratiocinations of scientists.
For good reasons, I am resisting to force the four (in)determinabilities discussed here into a
logical hierarchy: conceiving objects and happenings of nature to be its base, attended to by an
observer; and then, considering the coupling of these objects and happenings with their (possibly
flawed) observer as a (higher-order) meta-system, in turn examined by a meta-observer; and so forth.
Underlying such a hierarchy of including observers on different levels is the Theory of Logical
Types.14 Separately investigating systems on different levels of description--without allowing
communication or interventions across different levels of observers--stays entirely within the limits
of observational determinability. In adopting this hierarchical view, one remains trapped in just one
epistemology--much as intended by the Theory of Logical Types--unable to appreciate the reason for
observational indeterminability.
My explorations suggest another relationship between these ways of knowing: requisite
backgrounds. Languaging is often taken for granted, particularly when talking about phenomena.
Aboutness implies a separation of the phenomenon of interest and what languaging brings to one‟s
14

Note that Bertrand Russell‟s (1908) Theory of Logical Types was formulated to prevent paradoxes of self-reference
from entering the logic of representation, causing that logic to become indeterminable. It manages to preserve
determinability by stipulating this injunction: sets shall not contain themselves as a member--translated into the issues
considered here: observers shall not be part of the system they observe. According to the theory, observers belong to a
logically superior meta-domain. I am pleased to violate this injunction, and thereby open the door to other epistemologies:
where self-reference is allowed, where observers are able to communicate with one another across different kinds of
involvement, where human beings can be recognized for entering the world they seek to alter, and where the members of
social systems constitutively participate in describing themselves and the very system of which they are a part.
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attention. In contrast, the awareness of languaging one‟s identity into being provides the requisite
background to understanding the use of cultural artifacts. Having a sense of how particular artifacts
come to be used within a community is a prerequisite for improving them by design but for their use
by others. Creativity in designing conceptual systems, theories, and mathematical models is often
taken for granted--as background--if not denied in the belief that the outside world is decisive in what
„really‟ matters. Claiming to have „found‟ a „natural law,‟ for example, discounts the crucial role of
human creativity in the construction of such a law. Not only is creativity a latitude taken for granted,
but also one gone unrecognized, and therefore going to waste in claims of merely observing what is
presumed to be in front of one‟s eyes.
The (in)determinabilities discussed here are not the end of the story. Much exciting work is
ahead of us, unraveling their empirical, social, and philosophical implications.
REFERENCES
Bertalanffy, Ludwig von (1968) General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications,
New York: George Braziller.
Bremermann, Hans J. (1962) “Optimization through Evolution and Recombination” in M. C. Yovitz,
G. Jacoby, and G. Goldstein, Editors, Self-Organizing Systems, pp. 93-106, Washington,
DC: Spartan Books.
Chomsky, Noam (1957) Syntactic Structures, The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton.
Foerster, Heinz Von (1984) “Principles of Self-Organization in a Socio-Managerial Context”, in H.
Ulrich and G. J. B. Probst, Self-Organization and Management of Social Systems, pp. 2-24,
New York: Springer Verlag.
Gill, Arthur (1962) Introduction to the Theory of Finite State Machines, New York: McGraw Hill.
Glasersfeld, Ernst von (1995) Radical Constructivism; A Way of Knowing and Learning, London,
Washington DC: Falmer Press.
Krippendorff, Klaus (2005) The Semantic Turn; A new Foundation for Design, London and New
York: Taylor & Francis, in press.
Luhmann, Niklas (1995) Social Systems, translated by J. Bednarz, Jr. and W. D. Baecker, Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Maturana, Humberto R. and Francisco J. Varela (1972) Autopoiesis and Cognition; the Realization of
the Living, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Putnam, Hilary (1981) Reason, Truth and History, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Russell, Bertrand (1908) "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types," American Journal
of Mathematics, 30, pp. 222-262. Reprinted in B. Russell (1956) Logic and Knowledge, pp.
59-102, London: Allen and Unwin.

27

Saussure, Ferdinand de (1960) Course in General Linguistics, C. Bally and A. Sechehaye, Editors,
London: Peter Owen.
Shannon, Claude E. and Warren Weaver (1949) The Mathematical Theory of Communication.
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Simon, Herbert A. (1981) The Sciences of the Artificial (2nd.Ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Vico, Giambattista (1961) The New Science, translation by T. G. Bergen and M. H. Fisch of his
Principi di Scienza Nuova (1744), Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958) Philosophical Investigations, 3rd Ed., translated by G. E. M. Anscombe,
London: Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd.

